Hello! You're looking at a policy document report on Overton

We track government policy, guidelines, think tank research, working papers and more to help our customers see the impact and influence of their work.

If you fund, produce or manage research or work to influence policy, we'd love to talk. Learn more on our homepage.

Everything cited by this document (explore the cited scholarly articles) (explore the cited policy documents)

New England Journal of Medicine (Massachusetts Medical Society)
Na Zhu et al. 2020
Genetic analysis revealed that it is closely related to SARS-CoV and genetically clusters within the genus Betacoronavirus, forming a distinct clade in lineage B of the subgenus Sarbecovirus together with two bat-derived SARS-like strains [1,2].
On page 2
The virus was initially isolated in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid samples [2].
On page 2
2. Zhu N, Zhang D, Wang W, Li X, Yang B, Song J, et al. A Novel Coronavirus from Patients with Pneumonia in China, 2019. 24 January 2020. New England Journal of Medicine.
In a first study of the clinical features of the infection (published 24 January 2020), most of the 41 hospitalised patients presented with fever, cough, and myalgia or fatigue [4].
On page 2
January 2020 in almost all cases bilateral abnormalities, such as ground-glass opacities and sub segmental areas of consolidation in the milder cases, and lobular and sub segmental consolidation in cases admitted to ICU [4].
On page 3
Reported case fatality rates range from 4% in the Statement of the WHO Emergency Committee [8], to 14% when only recovered cases and deaths are included in the denominator, and 15% in the publication of a small case series of hospitalised patients [4,9].
On page 3
According to current knowledge, the clinical signs and symptoms of severe disease include fever, coughing or difficulty breathing, with the radiological findings of pneumonia [4].
On page 7
4. Huang C, Wang Y, Li X, Ren L, Zhao J, Hu Y, et al. Clinical features of patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China. The Lancet. 24 January 2020.
In a report of a family cluster including six cases, RT-PCR was negative in urine and stool samples [5].
On page 2
However, the report did not describe any possible onward transmission from this case [5].
On page 3
5. Chan JF-W, Yuan S, Kok K-H, To KK-W, Chu H, Yang J, et al. A familial cluster of pneumonia associated with the 2019 novel coronavirus indicating person-to-person transmission: a study of a family cluster. The Lancet. 24 January 2020.
So far, according to the WHO situation report of 27 January 2020, among the laboratory-confirmed cases, 17% are classified as severe [7].
On page 3
7. World Health Organization (WHO). Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report - 7 2020 [28 January 2020]. Available from: https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200127-sitrep-7-2019--ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=98ef79f5_2
Eurosurveillance (European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC))
Peng Wu et al. 2020
Reported case fatality rates range from 4% in the Statement of the WHO Emergency Committee [8], to 14% when only recovered cases and deaths are included in the denominator, and 15% in the publication of a small case series of hospitalised patients [4,9].
On page 3
9. Wu P, Hao X, Lau EHY, Wong JY, Leung KSM, Wu JT, et al. Real-time tentative assessment of the epidemiological characteristics of novel coronavirus infections in Wuhan, China, as at 22 January 2020. Eurosurveillance. 2020;25(3):2000044.
A more recent study of 99 cases hospitalised between 1 January and 20 January, reported that as of 25 January 31% had been discharged, 11% had died, and 58% were still admitted with final outcomes unknown at this time [10].
On page 3
In a published case series of the first 99 hospitalised cases, 17 (17%) patients developed acute respiratory distress syndrome and, 11 (11%) patients died of multiple organ failure, while the majority of the cases remain hospitalised and final outcomes are as yet unknown [10].
On page 3
10. Chen N, Zhou M, Dong X, Qu J, Gong F, Han Y, et al. Epidemiological and clinical characteristics of 99 cases of 2019 novel coronavirus pneumonia in Wuhan, China: a descriptive study. The Lancet. 29 January 2020.
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
This assessment is based on an evaluation of the limited evidence available and expert knowledge, following the ECDC rapid risk assessment methodology [11].
On page 3
11. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Operational tool on rapid risk assessment methodology: ECDC; 2019. Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/operational-tool-rapid-risk-assessmentmethodolgy-ecdc-2019.pdf
New England Journal of Medicine (Massachusetts Medical Society)
Qun Li et al. 2020
The reproductive number (R 0) has been estimated to be 2.2 (95% CI 1.4 to 3.9) [15].
On page 3
15. Li Q, Guan X, Wu P, Wang X, Zhou L, Tong Y, et al. Early Transmission Dynamics in Wuhan, China, of Novel Coronavirus–Infected Pneumonia. The New England Journal of Medicine. 29 January 2020.
The Lancet (Elsevier BV)
Chen Wang et al. 2020
Risk of healthcare-associated transmission Sixteen healthcare workers are reported to have been infected in Wuhan in connection with this outbreak, many from the same healthcare facility [25].
On page 5
25. Wang C, Horby PW, Hayden FG, Gao GF. A novel coronavirus outbreak of global health concern. The Lancet. 24 January 2020.
Based on the evidence from the SARS and MERS outbreaks, the likelihood of healthcare-associated transmission following management of a confirmed case is considered low, provided that appropriate IPC measures are implemented for staff, patients and visitors [26].
On page 5
26. World Health Organization (WHO). Infection prevention and control during healthcare when novel coronavirus (nCoV) infection is suspected. Interim Guidance. Geneva 2020. WHO/2019- nCoV/IPC/v2020.1. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications-detail/infection-prevention-andcontrol-during-health-care-when-novel-coronavirus-(ncov)-infection-is-suspected
Risk of infection for healthcare staff involved in aerosol-generating procedures without appropriate personal protection equipment (PPE) is considered high [27].
On page 5
27. Tran K, Cimon K, Severn M, Pessoa-Silva CL, Conly J. Aerosol generating procedures and risk of transmission of acute respiratory infections to healthcare workers: a systematic review. PLoS One. 2012;7(4):e35797-e.
Member States should review the national laboratory diagnostic capacity for coronaviruses and the procedures for transporting samples [31].
On page 5
EU/EEA countries should review their procedures for informing incoming and outgoing passengers from/to China of the situation concerning 2019-nCoV at their Points of Entry (PoE), also providing advice for persons who develop 2019-nCoV-compatible symptoms after their return, in accordance with national planning [31,35].
On page 6
In addition, Member States are urged to review their procedures for in-country transportation, isolation and management of high-consequence infectious disease cases, including staffing and laboratory support [31].
On page 7
31. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Health emergency preparedness for imported cases of high-consequence infectious diseases 2019 [17 January 2020]. Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/health-emergency-preparedness-imported-cases-highconsequence-infectious-diseases
Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease (Elsevier BV)
Y.L. Huizer et al. 2015
In general, evidence in peer-reviewed literature does not support entry screening as an efficient measure for detecting incoming travellers with infectious diseases, especially in this case where the symptoms of the disease are very common and the timeline coincides with the increased activity of seasonal influenza in Europe and China [36-40].
On page 6
36. Huizer Y, Swaan C, Leitmeyer K, Timen A. Usefulness and applicability of infectious disease control measures in air travel: a review. Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease. 2015;13(1):19-30.
In general, evidence in peer-reviewed literature does not support entry screening as an efficient measure for detecting incoming travellers with infectious diseases, especially in this case where the symptoms of the disease are very common and the timeline coincides with the increased activity of seasonal influenza in Europe and China [36-40].
On page 6
37. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Entry and exit screening measures 2014 [30 January 2020]. Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/media/en/publications/Publications/Ebola-outbreaktechnicalreport-exit-entry-screening-13Oct2014.pdf
Emerging Infectious Diseases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC))
Ronald K. St. John et al. 2005
In general, evidence in peer-reviewed literature does not support entry screening as an efficient measure for detecting incoming travellers with infectious diseases, especially in this case where the symptoms of the disease are very common and the timeline coincides with the increased activity of seasonal influenza in Europe and China [36-40].
On page 6
38. John RKS, King A, De Jong D, Bodie-Collins M, Squires SG, Tam TW. Border screening for SARS. Emerging Infectious Diseases. 2005;11(1):6.
The Medical Journal of Australia (Wiley)
Praveena J Gunaratnam et al. 2014
In general, evidence in peer-reviewed literature does not support entry screening as an efficient measure for detecting incoming travellers with infectious diseases, especially in this case where the symptoms of the disease are very common and the timeline coincides with the increased activity of seasonal influenza in Europe and China [36-40].
On page 6
39. Gunaratnam PJ, Tobin S, Seale H, Marich A, McAnulty J. Airport arrivals screening during pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza in New South Wales, Australia. Medical Journal of Australia. 2014;200(5):290-2.
Emerging Infectious Diseases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC))
Pei-Yun Shu et al. 2005
In general, evidence in peer-reviewed literature does not support entry screening as an efficient measure for detecting incoming travellers with infectious diseases, especially in this case where the symptoms of the disease are very common and the timeline coincides with the increased activity of seasonal influenza in Europe and China [36-40].
On page 6
40. Shu P-Y, Chien L-J, Chang S-F, Su C-L, Kuo Y-C, Liao T-L, et al. Fever screening at airports and imported dengue. Emerging Infectious Diseases. 2005;11(3):460.
Contact tracing EU/EEA countries should review their procedures for contact tracing and contact follow-up, and may wish to refer to guidance that ECDC has published on these activities [41].
On page 6
41. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Public health management of persons having had contact with novel coronavirus cases in the European Union 2020 [cited 30 January 2020]. Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/public-health-management-persons-having-hadcontact-novel-coronavirus-cases
Furthermore, aircraft passengers sitting two seats in all directions around a 2019-nCoV case, travel companions or persons providing care, and crew members serving the section of the aircraft where the index case was seated [42] would be considered a close contact.
On page 6
42. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Risk assessment guidelines for infectious diseases transmitted on aircraft (RAGIDA) Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) 2020 [updated January 2020]. Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/infectious-diseases-transmitted-on-aircraftsragida-risk-assessment-guidelines.pdf
WHO’s interim guidance recommends placement of suspected and confirmed cases in single rooms, implementation of contact and droplet precautions, and airborne precautions when performing aerosol generating procedures or interventions [43-45].
On page 7
45. World Health Organization (WHO). Infection prevention and control of epidemic-and pandemic prone acute respiratory infections in healthcare. WHO guidelines 2014 [17 January 2020]. Available from: https://www.who.int/csr/bioriskreduction/infection_control/publication/en/
Canadian Journal of Microbiology (Canadian Science Publishing)
Alain Lamarre et al. 1989
Lipid-enveloped RNA viruses such as the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) should be readily removed and/or inactivated during the manufacturing of plasma derivatives [46,47].
On page 7
46. Lamarre A, Talbot PJ. Effect of pH and temperature on the infectivity of human coronavirus 229E. Canadian Journal of Microbiology. 1989;35(10):972-4.
Experimental Biology and Medicine (SAGE Publications)
R. A. Bucknall et al. 1972
Lipid-enveloped RNA viruses such as the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) should be readily removed and/or inactivated during the manufacturing of plasma derivatives [46,47].
On page 7
47. Bucknall RA, King LM, Kapikian AZ, Chanock RM. Studies with human coronaviruses II. Some properties of strains 229E and OC43. Proceedings of the Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine. 1972;139(3):722-7.